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INTRODUCTION 
 
Your Royal Highness, Tunku Ampuan Najihah binti Almarhum Tunku Besar 
Burhanuddin, Chancellor of the Islamic Science University of Malaysia 
(USIM) (incidentally, an old SOAS Alumni); The USIM Dean of the Faculty 
of Syariah and Law, Professor (Dr.) Abdul Samat Musa; Respected Chairman; 
Learned Members of the Bench and Bar here present; Other Faculty Members 
and Academic Colleagues here present; Honourable Invited Guests; Students; 
Ladies and Gentlemen; - Assalaamu Alaykum; Selamat pagi; and Good 
morning. 
 Please permit to start by expressing my gratefulness to the USIM Faculty 
of Syariah and Law, for this high academic honour of inviting me to give the 
4th prestigious Annual Tuanku Najihah Syariah and Law Lecture this year. I 
feel highly honoured to be here and I greatly commend your efforts in trying to 
promote a better understanding of Shar‘ah1 and Law through this annual 
lecture series.  
 
 Professor of Law and Head of the School of Law, SOAS, University of London. 
Email: mb78@soas.ac.uk . This is a revised and updated version of the paper delivered 
by the author at the 4th Tuanku Najihah Syariah and Law Lecture hosted by the Faculty 
of Syariah and Law, Islamic Science University of Malaysia (USIM) in honour of her 
Royal Majesty Tuanku Najihah binti Almarhum Tunku Besar Burhanuddin, in Kuala 
Lumpur on 14th July 2009. 
1 Although the adopted spelling in Malaysia is “Syariah”, the more generally used 
spelling “Shar‘ah” would be used herein from this point onwards. 
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The topic for this year’s lecture is “Administration of Justice under the 
Shar‘ah, Common Law and Civil Law Systems: Towards a Better 
Understanding”. This topic is not only of high academic importance but is also 
of great practical significance, because these three legal systems are major 
legal systems2 in the world today, sometimes operating side by side, through 
which justice is administered in different ways that affect the lives of millions 
of people in different countries. There is usually a trend of promoting a climate 
of total conflict between the Shar‘ah system and “Western” legal systems, 
which often overshadows the many areas of common ground between the three 
systems, especially in relation to the administration of justice.  Owing to the 
necessary interaction between different legal systems in the modern world, it is 
imperative that legal scholars and practitioners continue to promote a better 
understanding of the different systems to encourage effective administration of 
justice globally. However, the topic is also quite complex, because, even 
though these three legal systems represent specific legal traditions, their details 
of application are not really monolithic but varies from country to country. For 
example, the details of application of the Common Law system in the United 
Kingdom, differs in many ways from that of the United States of America and 
countries in Africa and Asia. One would also find differences in the details of 
the Civil Law system as applied in different civil law jurisdications such as 
France, Germany or Italy. Similarly, there are differences in the details of 
application of the Shar‘ah, in different Muslim countries, not least of which is 
the differences in the schools of jurisprudence followed in the different 
countries. 
 This paper can, therefore, only be a general and modest contribution to 
trigger further enquiry on the subject. It provides a basic but critical analysis of 
the main features and historical evolution of the three legal systems and their 
relevant judicial processes and institutions, highlighting areas of similarities 
and differences and how the interactions between them may be harnessed for 
better administration of justice from both a domestic and international 
perspective.  
 In his book on Invitation to Law, Professor Brian Simpson observed 
notably that: 
 
2 See generally, R. David & J.E.C. Brierly. 1979. Major Legal Systems in the World 
Today. London: Steven & Sons. 
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Legal systems do not emerge out of nothing; they possess a history, 
and reflect ideas, and make use of institutions, which have 
developed over time, and been moulded by cultural and political 
forces.3
That is absolutely true of each of the three legal systems examined in this 
paper. Owing to historical, cultural, religious, colonial and political factors, 
each of these three legal systems applies either solely or side by side each 
other in many countries of the world today. In different parts of the Muslim 
world, the Shar‘ah system applies side by side with either the Common Law 
or the Civil Law system. For example, in countries such as Malaysia, Nigeria, 
Pakistan and the Sudan, the Shar‘ah and Common Law systems apply side by 
side, with Shar‘ah Courts and Common Law Courts administering justice 
within their respective allocated jurisdictions.  In other countries such as 
Egypt, Indonesia, Kuwait, and Tunisia, the Shar‘ah and Civil Law systems 
apply side by side, also with Shar‘ah Courts and Civil Law Courts 
administering justice within their respective allocated jurisdictions. In these 
interactions of legal systems, there have been instances of agreements and 
disagreements between the systems both on legal principles and processes. A 
comparative study of the underlying general principles of the three legal 
systems can therefore be a very effective way for promoting a better 
understanding and harmony between them.  
 Domestically, there are ongoing academic and judicial efforts in different 
Muslim countries,4 including Malaysia,5 to explore possible ways of realising 
 
3 A. W. B. Simpson.1988. Invitation to Law. Oxford: Blackwell Publications. p.55. 
4 See e.g. the Northern Nigerian case of Tela Rijiyan Dorawa v Hassan Daudu (1975) 
NNLR, 87 and the Pakistan Supreme Court Case of Benazir Bhuto v The Federation of 
Pakistan (1988) 40 PLD (S. Ct) 416. For similar attempts by the Egyptian Supreme 
Constitutional Court, see e.g. C.B. Lombardi & N. J. Brown, “Do Constitutions 
Requiring Adherence to Shari’a Threaten Human Rights?: How Egypt’s Constitutional 
Court Reconciles Islamic Law with the Liberal Rule of Law” (2006) 21 American 
University International Law Review, pp.379-435. 
5 See e.g. (Tun) A. H. Mohamad, “Harmonization of Common Law and Shari’ah in 
Malaysia: A Practical Approach”, Paper delivered at the Abd Al-Razzaq Al-Sanhuri 
Lecture, Harvard Law School, 6 November, 2008. Available online at: 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/ilsp/events/Harmonization%20of%20Common%
20Law%20and%20the%20Shari'ah%20in%20Malaysia.pdf (Unless otherwise stated all 
internet references were last accessed on 21/12/10). 
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necessary harmony between the principles of administration of justice under 
the Shar‘ah and Common Law or the Shar‘ah and Civil Law systems 
respectively. Even Saudi Arabia, which is normally considered as a 
traditionally conservative Muslim country, has recently committed nearly two 
billion dollars to legal reforms in the country,6 including the introduction of 
case reporting within its Shar‘ah legal system through the publication and 
distribution of judicial reports called Mudawwanah al-AÍkm al-QaÌ´iyyah 
by its Ministry of Justice from February 2007. The four current volumes of the 
judicial reports are freely available on the Ministry’s website.7 Different 
propositions on how to devise possible methodologies of harmonization to 
“bring greater coordination and consonance” between these legal systems have 
also been put forward by legal scholars and experts.8 Certainly, a good 
coordination of the principles of administration of justice between the three 
legal systems can greatly promote the realisation of substantive justice within 
the legal systems of Muslim States where the Shar‘ah applies side by side 
with either the Common Law or Civil Law. This sentiment was reflected in an 
observation of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in the 1991 case of Akbar Ali v 
Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Rawalpindi and Another, where the Court 
noted, inter alia, that: 
 
Since the introduction of Islamic law and jurisprudence in our [i.e. 
Pakistani] Constitutional setup … the emphasis on real substantive 
justice has increased manifold. So much so that although it is not 
enshrined in the Constitution as a fundamental right, … the right to 
obtain justice as is ordained by Islam, has become [an] inviolable 
right of citizens of Pakistan.9
This indicates the possibility of positive mutual impact of the different 
legal systems on one another where they apply side by side domestically, 
based on the common objective of achieving the fair administration of justice.  
 
6 See news item at:  http://www.ameinfo.com/134904.html. 
7 http://www.moj.gov.sa/Arabic/JudicialBlog/Pages/versions.aspx. 
8 See e.g. M. H. Kamali, “Shari’ah and Civil Law: Towards a Methodology of 
Harmonization” (2007) 14 Islamic Law and Society, No.3, pp.391-420. 
9 (1991) 3 SCMR, 2114. 
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From an international perspective, a better understanding of the 
principles and processes of administration of justice under each of the three 
legal systems can greatly encourage respect for international minimum 
standards of fair trial and due process as envisaged under international human 
rights instruments. Although every State has the sovereign right to adopt any 
legal system of its choice, there are, nevertheless, identifiable international 
norms of administration of justice aimed at ensuring equity and fair play in the 
delivery of justice by every State to everyone within its jurisdiction. Such 
international minimum standards include the guarantee of fair and public 
hearing;  independent and impartial tribunals; the right to a remedy; the right to 
counsel and to free legal assistance where necessary; the right to adequate time 
and facilities for the preparation of defence; the right to an interpreter; the right 
to trial without undue delay; the right to equality of arms and procedural rights;  
protection against double jeopardy; and the right of appeal to a higher tribunal, 
among others.10 Today, the administration of justice under every legal system 
is normally weighed against these international minimum standards.   
 An important point that cannot be overemphasised is that, while there 
are, no doubt, some fundamental differences in the nature and sources of these 
three legal systems respectively, there are also significant areas of conceptual 
and evolutional similarities between them that can certainly promote a positive 
interaction between them and also enhance the realisation of fair trial and due 
process in the administration of justice internationally. 
 In addressing this important topic, this paper will first examine the nature 
and need for administration of justice in human society, followed by an 
analysis of the nature and historical evolution of each of the three legal 
systems in relation to administration of justice. The final part of the paper will 
then provide a brief critical analysis of institutional and procedural parameters 
of administration of justice in relation to the three legal systems. 
 
10 See e.g. UN Draft Body of Principles on the Right to a Fair Trial and a Remedy, 
Annex to UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/24/Add.1 of 25 June 1993. See also generally, 
Art. 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) 999 UNTS 
171. 
6 Administration of Justice Under The SharÊÑah, Common Law and Civil Law 
THE NEED FOR, AND NATURE OF, ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 
 
On the need for administration of justice in human society, Waheed Husain has 
concisely observed that: 
 
From the dawn of civilization when societies were gradually formed, 
people required protection from wrong doers. Not only life and 
property were protected, but social and personal disputes were 
required to be settled and antagonistic claims adjusted. Hence arose 
the necessity of administration of justice.11 
Generally, justice is about determining and remedying rights and wrongs 
in human society, and settling disputes impartially between disputing parties in 
ways that ensure peace and harmony in human relations. The ultimate aim of 
every legal system is to be able to deliver justice fairly to everyone through 
due process of law so that a decent social order can be maintained. That 
process of delivering justice fairly to everyone is what is normally termed the 
administration of justice, and it is today, in the formal sense, a State-sponsored 
or State-monitored process. Specifically, it refers to the processes through 
which justice is properly and equitably achieved free from arbitrariness or 
suspicion of bias. Under the Shar‘ah system, the Qur’an provides in many 
places that justice must be done equitably and without bias.12 An important 
rule of natural justice in that regard which was restated in the 1924 English 
case of R v Sussex, Ex parte McCarthy13 is that “Justice must not only be 
done; but must be seen to be done”.   
 To prevent arbitrariness in the administration of justice, law is usually 
sub-divided into substantive law and procedural or adjectival law. Substantive 
law provides for the substance of what is legally right and legally wrong within 
a legal system, while procedural law outlines the processes and procedure 
through which rights are sought and wrongs vindicated. Substantive law is 
about ensuring certainty of the law, while procedural law is about ensuring due 
process in applying the law. Both are, without doubt, necessary for the 
 
11 W. Husain. 1934. Administration of Justice During the Muslim Rule in India: With A 
History of Islamic Legal Institutions. Calcutta: Calcutta University Press. p.1. 
12 See e.g. Q4:58: Q4:135; Q5:8 and Q16:90. 
13 [1924] 1 KB 256, [1923] All ER 233. 
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effective administration of justice under every legal system. By its nature, 
however, the administration of justice is more associated with institutions and 
procedures for the fair delivery of justice. Thus, in terms of delivery, it leans 
more towards procedural law, because without proper institutional and 
procedural standards justice cannot really be achieved and substantive law 
would be practically ineffective, no matter how well-crafted they are. While, 
the importance of procedural law to the administration of justice is recognised 
under each of the three legal systems, it appears that the Common Law system 
traditionally gave more importance to procedural law than the Civil Law and 
the Shari’ah Systems. It must also be said, however, that the traditional 
differences between the three systems in that regard is constantly shrinking, 
with many positive developments being undertaken under both the Civil Law 
and Shar‘ah systems in recent times. 
 With regard to the traditional emphasis on procedural law in the 
administration of justice under the Common Law system, David and Brierly 
have noted that: 
 
Matters relating to the administration of justice, procedure, evidence 
and execution of judicial decisions have, for Common Law lawyers, 
an importance equal, or even superior, to substantive rules of law 
because historically their immediate preoccupation has been to re-
establish peace rather than articulate a moral basis for the social 
order.14 
With regard to the Civil Law system, David and Brierly further observed 
that: 
 
Continental jurists have traditionally concentrated on “substantive 
law”... They have neglected matters of procedure ... those rules in the 
Anglo-American tradition known collectively as... adjectival law.15 
Thus, the traditional understanding has always been that while Common 
Law emphasises procedural norms in the administration of justice, Civil law, 
on the contrary, emphasises strict adherence to substantive law. Nevertheless, 
 
14 David & Brierly, supra, fn 3 above, p.23. 
15 Ibid, at  327. 
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the importance of procedural law is not unrecognised under the Civil Law 
tradition. For example, the first three sections of the ancient Twelve Tables of 
Roman law (Lex Duodecim Tabulae),16 which is considered to be the earliest 
substantive code of law in ancient Rome, are clearly provisions relating to 
procedural rules on administration of justice. The importance of procedural 
law to the effective administration of justice was also demonstrated in the 
codifications of modern civil law in the 19th century by the enactment of, for 
example, the French Napoleonic Code of Civil Procedure in 1806 and other 
codifications of procedural law enacted in countries like Italy in 1865 and 
Germany in 1877.17 Also, writing in 1967 on the Italian civil law system, 
Cappelletti and others observed that 
 
For at least the past sixty years, no complaint may properly be made 
in Italy… that procedure and evidence have been neglected by legal 
scholarship. Since the beginning of this century, procedure has been 
one of the fields in which the doctrine has been most active and 
influential. The influence of legal scholarship is not limited to the 
drafting of the current code; it has also had great impact on the 
interpretation and practice followed in the courts.18 
With regard to the Shar‘ah legal system, some scholars have argued that 
the Shar‘ah does not really distinguish between substantive law and 
procedural law. That view is contestable.  To appreciate the distinction 
between substantive and procedural law under the Shar‘ah legal system 
requires a distinction between Shar‘ah and Fiqh as will be analysed later.  
While it is true that both the Qur’an and the Sunnah, which are the main divine 
sources of Islamic law, mostly contain provisions relating to substantive law, 
yet there are some provisions that relate to procedural norms too. Furthermore, 
the early Muslim jurists demonstrated their appreciation of the importance of 
procedural law by identifying and discussing relevant procedural rules in their 
analysis of the administration of justice under the Shar‘ah legal system in 
 
16 “The Twelve Tables of Roman Law”, 451BC – 450BC, See http://www.csun.edu/- 
~hcfll004/12tables.html for a text of this Code. 
17 Encyclopædia Britannica Online. http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/4776- 
61/procedural-law.
18 M. Cappelletti, et. al. 1967. The Italian Legal System: An Introduction. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press. pp.160-61. 
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their jurisprudential writings on judicial practice (al-QaÌ´). Most classical 
books of Islamic jurisprudence (Fiqh) have a section on judicial practices (al-
´AqÌiyyah), with relevant rules on administration of justice under the Shar‘ah 
system19 that were well ahead of the rules applicable under other systems of 
law at that time, even though some of those classical rules may apparently be 
seen as outmoded in modern times. 
 It must be re-emphasised, however, that highlighting the role of 
procedural law in the administration of justice does not mean that the role of 
substantive law should be under-estimated. For example, the law of evidence 
which is an important aspect of procedure is essentially substantive law by 
itself. While procedural law is very important to the administration of justice, 
the ultimate aim of any effective system of justice would not be to merely 
attain procedural justice but to realise substantive justice. Procedural law is 
therefore not an end in itself but a means for the overall attainment of 
substantive justice in the administration of justice. 
 
THE NATURE AND HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE THREE LEGAL 
SYSTEMS 
 
As earlier observed at the beginning of this paper, legal systems do not emerge 
from nothing but possess history, which shape their systems and processes 
over time. In other words, the truth of any legal system lies in its history.  
Thus, in seeking to understand the administration of justice under each of these 
legal systems, it is necessary to examine their individual nature and historical 
evolution.  
 While the different historical foundations and evolution of the three legal 
systems may account, on the one hand, for the traditional differences in their 
respective processes, there are, on the other hand, evident similarities in their 
respective historical evolution, which, perhaps, indicate also that the different 
legal systems and processes have actually been guided by reasonableness and 
 
19 See e.g. I. A. K. Nyazee, (Trans.). 2000. The Distinguished Jurist’s Primer: Bidāyat 
al-Mujtahid wa Nihāyat al-Muqtasid by Ibn Rushd. Reading: Garnet Publishing Ltd., 
2000. Vol. 2; and al-Māwardi. 1996. Al-Ahkâm as-Sultâniyyah: The Laws of Islamic 
Governance, Trans. Yate, A. London: Ta Ha Publishers. 
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expediency across the different civilisations throughout human history.  As 
legal historians traditionally consider the Civil Law system to be the oldest of 
the three by its linkage to ancient Roman law, we will begin with it first 
followed by the Shar‘ah system and then the Common Law system 
respectively. 
 
The Civil Law System  
 
For clarity, it is necessary to first point out that the term “Civil Law” can be 
used in, at least, three different contexts.  
 First, the term can be used to distinguish between the civil aspects of any 
legal system as “civil law” and the criminal aspects as “criminal law”. This 
distinction exists in all legal systems. Although it is not in that context that the 
term is being generally used in this paper, it does have relevance to the process 
of administration of justice, especially in relation to classifying procedure into 
civil and criminal procedures respectively, as will be discussed later.  
 Secondly, the term “Civil Law” is often used in Muslim countries to 
distinguish between the Shar‘ah legal system (as an Islamic religious system) 
on the one hand and “Western” legal systems generally (as secular systems) on 
the other. In that sense both the Common Law and the Civil Law systems are 
often referred to jointly as “civil law”. Thus, in some Muslim countries, 
common law courts are generally referred to as “civil law courts” to 
distinguish them from the Shar‘ah courts. In that context it is important to 
remember that those courts although called “civil law courts” actually apply 
common law rules and procedure rather than civil law rules and procedure.  
 Thirdly, the term Civil Law refers in a general context to the Civil law 
system as a distinctive legal tradition. In that sense it is distinguished from 
other legal traditions such as the Common Law system and the Shar‘ah 
system respectively. It is in this third context that the Civil Law system is 
being considered in relation to the other two legal systems in this paper. 
 The Civil Law system or tradition originated in Europe and it continues, 
today, to be a principal legal tradition in Europe, Latin America as well as in 
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parts of Asia and Africa.20 Legal historians traditionally date its origins to 
ancient Rome as far back as 450 BC when the Lex Duodecim Tabularum21 was 
enacted in Rome, long before the beginning of the Roman Empire.22 Four 
centuries after the enactment  of the Lex Duodecim Tabularum, there 
developed, by 27 BC, a body of private jurists from the upper classes of 
Roman society who gained significant prominence separate from the 
traditional courts within the Roman legal system. These private jurists, called 
jurisconsults, regularly provided expert legal advice to the public and to the 
courts, especially when the courts were confronted with difficult legal 
questions in cases before them. The jurists were not State or public officers, 
but due to their jurisprudential expertise in the legal texts and the services they 
provided to the courts and to the populace, they gained much prominence and 
respect above the lay judges and magistrates of the courts who were non-
professionals appointed on ad hoc and short term basis by the State. The jurists 
were the ones who provided written technical advice about the law and 
interpretation of textual material, such as the Lex Duodecim Tabularum or 
other imperial edicts, to the judges and to the public generally. They were thus 
almost solely responsible for the development of a comprehensive 
jurisprudence, independent of judicial decisions, in response to the continuing 
changing demands of Roman society. The short-term, non-professional 
character of the Roman judiciary and its method of case disposal resulted in 
the non-accordance of any significant importance or precedential role to the 
judicial decisions in individual cases under the Roman legal system, which 
was subsequently transferred unto the modern Civil Law system.  
 As will be discussed later in our analysis of the Shar‘ah legal system, 
there is some similarity between this role of private jurisconsults under ancient 
 
20 See generally, J.H. Merryman & R. Perez-Perdomo. 2007. The Civil Law Tradition. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 3rd Ed. pp.2-3.  
21 “The Twelve Tables of Roman Law”, 451BC – 450BC, considered to be the earliest 
attempt by the Romans to create a Code of Law that would be binding on everyone in 
Rome. See e.g. http://www.csun.edu/~hcfll004/12tables.html for a text of this Code, 
22 See however the view of David and Brierley that the Civil Law system as such 
(Romano-Germanic system of law) appeared in the thirteenth century and that the 
period of incubation preceding this lacked any idea of system as such.  R. David & 
J.E.C. Brierley. 1978. Major Legal Systems in the World Today. London: Stevens & 
Sons. p.33. 
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Roman law and that of the classical Muslim jurists in the development of 
Islamic law too through similar private jurisprudential scholarship. 
 Over the centuries, there eventually developed a large accumulation of 
jurisprudential material and different points of view on Roman law, which 
sometimes created conflicts and uncertainty in the law. Thus, Emperor 
Justinian deemed it desirable during his rule in the 6th century, “to resolve 
[the] conflicts and doubts [in the law] and to organize what was worth 
retaining into some systematic form”.23 He consequently ordered the 
comprehensive compilation of the imperial edicts and the authoritative 
writings and interpretations of the established jurists over the centuries into a 
single body of law known as the Corpus Juris Civilis (Body of Civil Law) 
often referred to as the Justinian Code, after the name of the Emperor. 
Merryman and Perez-Perdomo have identified in that regard that:  
 
In particular Justinian was concerned about the great number, length, 
and variety of commentaries and treatises written by legal scholars 
(called jurisconsults). He sought [through the compilation of the 
Justinian Code] both to abolish the authority of all but the greatest of 
jurisconsults of the classical period and to make it unnecessary for 
any more commentaries or treatises to be written. On publication of 
the Corpus Juris Civilis, Justinian forbade any further reference to the 
works of jurisconsults. Those of their works that he approved were 
included in the Corpus Juris Civilis, and henceforward reference was 
to be made to it, rather than to the original authorities.24 
A study of the history of Islamic law will reveal that there is also some 
similarity here with the concept of the closing of the gate of Ijtihd during the 
developmental stages of Islamic law around the 13th century when the 
classical Muslim jurists felt that all essential questions of Islamic law had been 
thoroughly discussed and finally settled,25 and thus the jurisprudential 
scholarship of the jurists became restricted to merely commenting on the 
works of the past master jurists. The theoretical concept of the closing of the 
 
23 J.H. Merryman & R. Perez-Perdomo, supra, fn 21 above, p.7.   
24 Ibid.,  p.7. 
25 J. Schacht. 1983. An Introduction to Islamic Law. New York: Oxford University 
Press. p.70; See also generally N. Coulson. 1995. A History of Islamic Law. Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press. 
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gate of Ijtihd by the Muslim jurists in the 13th century was also partially 
aimed at regulating the legal process by controlling the divergence in 
interpretations and commentaries of the different jurists.26 
With the compilation of the Justinian Code in the 6th century, Emperor 
Justinian drove the final nail into the coffin of the non-significance of judicial 
precedent in ancient Roman law as well as the role of judicial precedent in 
latter Civil Law practice, establishing the principle that “legal decisions should 
be rendered in accordance with the law and not with examples” (non exemplis 
sed legibus judicandum est).27 The Justinian Code thus became the essential 
building block for the substantive and procedural principles of the Civil Law 
system.   
 Glenn notes that the “Romans took their law with them, all over Europe, 
as far north as what we now know as Germany and as far west as the British 
Isles”.28 There was a decline for many centuries after the Romans were 
eventually driven out of Europe, and Roman law was in the words of Glenn, 
driven off “the European territorial map for centuries, except for rudimentary 
versions of it in Italy and the south of France”, but  it  “came crashing back” in 
Europe  in the 11th to 13th centuries.29 During the intellectual reawakening of 
the mid-eleventh century in Europe, Roman Civil Law was “re-discovered” 
and revived in Italy with the Justinian Code as the main law studied in the first 
European University in Bologna, Italy. Scholars came from all over Europe to 
study that law at Bologna and returned to teach it to others in their own cities.  
Other European universities later followed suit, and the Justinian Code again 
re-emerged as the basis of legal study in Europe until around the 17th and 18th 
Century when its rules were re-examined in the light of modern reasoning. By 
the 19th century there had begun a systematic codification of modern civil law 
in many civil law jurisdictions such as France, Germany and Italy, which 
 
26 The concept of the complete closing of the gate of Ijtihād has however been 
challenged by some scholars.  See e.g. W. Hallaq, “Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?” 
(1984) International Journal of Middle East Studies, No.1, pp.341. 
27 J.G. Apple & R.P Deyling, A Primer on the Civil Law System (1995) p.5. Available 
on the Federal Judicial Centre website at:  http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/- 
civillaw.pdf/$file/civillaw.pdf  
28 H. P. Glenn. 2010. Legal Traditions of the World, 4th Ed. New York: Oxford 
University Press. p.139. 
29 Ibid.,  p.140. 
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constituted the authoritative legal texts in those jurisdictions. From its origins 
in Rome and later continental Europe, the Civil Law system gradually spread 
to many areas in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, which were colonies of 
France, the Netherlands, Spain or Portugal. The legal systems of many North 
African and Middle Eastern nations are strongly influenced by the French 
civil-law system, operating side by side with Islamic legal traditions. The 
precise application of the Civil Law system however varies widely in the 
different jurisdictions, but yet maintaining the traditional fundamental nature 
of the Civil Law system as a codification-based system of law, with judges 
restricted to simple interpretation and application of the law cautiously in the 
interest of certainty to the effect that prior judicial decisions are not formally 
considered as law, as is the case under the Common Law system.  
 In relation to the role of the judiciary in the administration of justice, the 
civil law system traditionally sees judges as merely “operators of the law”. 
Merryman and Perez-Perdomo illustrate this as follows: 
 
In deciding a case, the judge extracts the relevant facts from the raw 
problem, characterizes the legal question that these facts present, 
finds the appropriate legislative provision, and applies it to the 
problem. Unless the legal scientist and the legislator have failed in 
their functions, the task of the judge is a simple one; there is only one 
correct solution, and there is no room for the exercise of discretion. If 
the judge has difficulty finding the applicable provision or 
interpreting and applying that provision to the fact situation, then one 
of the following people must be at fault: the judge, who does not know 
how to follow clear instructions; the legislator, who failed to draft 
clearly stated and clearly applicable legislation; or the legal scholar, 
who has either failed to perceive and correct defects in the legal 
science or has failed to instruct the legislator and judge properly on 
how to draft and apply statutes. No other explanation is permissible. If 
everyone did his or her job right, the judge would have no difficulty in 
finding, interpreting, and applying the applicable law.30 
As Merryman and Perez-Perdomo further observe, certainty of the law 
was of the utmost importance under the Civil Law system. 
 
30 J.H. Merryman & R. Perez-Perdomo, supra, fn 21 above, p.81. 
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Hovering over the entire legal process is a brooding anxiety about 
certainty ... [which] requires that the law be completely, coherently, 
and clearly stated by the legislature, and only by the legislature. 
Judges are restricted to interpretation and application of “the law” in 
the interest of certainty, and prior judicial decisions are not “law”. 
Judges are also denied the power to temper the rigor of a rule in a 
hard case. All non-legal considerations must be excluded from the law 
in the interest of certainty. Considerations of justice or other ends of 
the law must be excluded for the same reason. Hard cases, unjust 
decisions, unrealistic decisions, are regrettable, but they are the price 
one has to pay for certainty.31 
Considering the earlier observation that the ultimate objective of 
administration of justice is to realise substantive justice, this strict adherence to 
the letter of codified law under the Civil Law system could raise many 
practical problems for judges. The traditional critique against the Civil Law 
system, especially by Common Law advocates, has therefore often been that it 
is too “code-centric” giving little or no room for the exercise of judicial 
discretion, which in turn could impact on substantive justice.  
 In reality, civil law judges do frequently find themselves confronted by 
practical problem cases in which the only applicable legislation is either too 
general, unclear, contradictory in application, or that the legislature did not 
foresee the problem now facing the judge. In such situations they neither give 
up on the ground that the law is not clear nor make unrealistic or unjust 
decisions. Rather, they usually try to create reasonable law out of the general 
or unclear legislation without admitting to doing so. Thus, even though 
administration of justice under the civil law system is fundamentally a 
codification-based system, yet civil law judges do improvise in the interest of 
justice, in ways that would be considered as law making by their Common 
Law counterparts, where it is necessary to do so, even though they would deny 
law making and try as far as possible to show that their decision was based on 
the obviously general and unclear legislation.32 This practically makes modern 
civil law judges more than mere “operators of the law” by pragmatically 
 
31 Ibid., p.82. 
32 Ibid. 
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stepping into the role of the ancient Roman jurisconsults to fill any lacunae 
that might confront them in deciding cases before them from time to time.  
 
The Shar‘ah System 
 
The Shar‘ah system differs significantly from both the Civil and Common 
Law systems because it has a religious foundation and based on divine sources 
through revelation received from God by Prophet MuÍammad (pbuh)33 over a 
period of 23 years in the 7th Century.  However, where the scope of the 
immutable divine basis of the Shar‘ah is extended to also cover the mutable 
human aspect of the system, it can have a restrictive impact on administration 
of justice under the system. There is often a traditional misconception that the 
whole Shar‘ah legal system is divine and immutable, which usually arises 
from the non-distinction between the sources and the methods of the system. 
Traditionally, the Shar‘ah system is usually presented as having four sources, 
namely: the Qur’an,34 the Sunnah,35 IjmÑ,36 and Qiys37 with all of them 
depicted as being divine and immutable, which can be misleading, particularly 
in relation to administration of justice. It is more accurate to classify the 
Qur’an and the Sunnah as the sources, which are divine and immutable, and 
classify IjmÑ, and Qiys as the methods, which are non-divine and variable. 
For a better appreciation of the nature of administration of justice under the 
Shar‘ah system, it is necessary to note that the term “Shar‘ah” can also be 
used in, at least, three different contexts. 
 First, it can be used in a generic religious sense to refer to the Muslims’ 
way of life generally. In that context it covers both issues of “non-law” and 
issues of strict “law”, i.e., Islamic ethical, moral, religious, spiritual and legal 
stipulations as a whole. In that context not all Shar‘ah stipulations are 
justiciable, that is, enforceable juridically. Thus when we talk about 
administration of justice under the Shar‘ah, the non-law issues, even though 
 
33 The abbreviation “pbuh” means “Peace be upon him” and is a prayer offered when 
the name of Prophet Muhammad is mentioned of written. 
34 The holy book of Muslims. 
35 Traditions and Practices of Prophet Muhammad. 
36 Juristic Consensus. 
37 Analogical Deductions. 
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they are part of the Shar‘ah, would not normally be covered, because they are 
not justiciable. This can be illustrated with the following three Qur’anic 
provisions: 
 Q4:86 provides that: 
 
 	
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When you are greeted with a greeting, greet in return with what is 
better than it, or (at least) return it equally. Certainly, God is a 
Careful Account Taker of all things.
This Qur’anic obligation to return a greeting in a better or at least in a 
similar way is only a moral and ethical obligation enjoined on Muslims, which 
is not justiciable. Thus, one Muslim cannot bring legal action in a Shar‘ah 
court against another Muslim who fails to return a greeting despite being 
enjoined to do so under the Shar‘ah.
Also Q3:97 provides that:  
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And Hajj (pilgrimage) to The House (Ka’bah) is a duty owed to God 
by everyone who is able to undertake it…”.  
 
Similarly, the Qur’anic obligation to perform the hajj pilgrimage is a 
religious and spiritual obligation enjoined on Muslims who can afford it, but 
which is not justiciable. Thus, no legal action can be brought in a Shar‘ah 
court against a Muslim who fails to perform the hajj pilgrimage, even though 
he has a religious obligation under the Shar‘ah to do so. 
 And Q3:97 provides that:  
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There is a share for men and a share for women from what is left by 
parents and near relations, whether the property be small or large, a 
legal share.
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Unlike the previous two provisions, the Qur’anic stipulation on the right 
to inheritance is not merely ethical but also justiciable. Thus, a person can 
bring legal action to enforce his or her right in the Shar‘ah courts if, for 
example, there is an attempt to exclude that person from his or her legal share 
in the estate of the late parents. 
 Thus while all the three Qur’anic verses cited above are Shar‘ah 
stipulations, the first relates to the moral and ethical (“non-law”), the second to 
the religious and spiritual, (“non-law”) and the third to the strictly legal 
(“law”). In relation to administration of justice only the third type of Shar‘ah 
stipulations would be relevant, bearing in mind our earlier explanation that 
administration of justice is about determining and remedying rights and 
wrongs in human society. 
 Secondly, the term Shar‘ah can also be used in a general legal sense in 
reference to the Islamic legal system as a distinct legal tradition with its own 
sources, methods, principles and procedures, separate from other legal 
traditions such as the Common Law and Civil Law systems.  It is in that 
context that the Shar‘ah is being considered in comparison with the other two 
legal systems in this paper. However, when the term Shar‘ah is used in that 
context, there is the need to be cautious not to perceive the whole system as 
completely divine and thereby considered inflexible and unchangeable. It is 
such wrong perception that usually stands in the way of legitimate propositions 
to adjust the traditional processes and procedures of administration of justice 
under the Shar‘ah legal system in many Muslim States to meet the 
challenging dynamics of the administration of justice in today’s world. There 
is therefore always the important need to distinguish between what is divine 
and immutable and what is human and variable within the Shar‘ah legal 
system. Thus to prevent against such erroneous mix-up, it is more desirable, in 
my view, to use the phrase “Islamic legal system” instead of “Shar‘ah legal 
system” in appreciation of the fact that while the system consists of divine 
sources (i.e. the Shar‘ah), it also certainly consists of human jurisprudence 
(i.e. Fiqh), which brings us to the third context of the term. 
 Thirdly, the term Shar‘ah can be used specifically in reference to only 
the Islamic divine sources, namely, the Qur’an and the Sunnah. In that context 
it is distinguished from Fiqh, which is the human methodical and 
jurisprudential aspect of Islamic law. So while the Shar‘ah is in this sense 
divine and immutable, the legal rulings derived from the Shar‘ah through 
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Fiqh are not immutable but variable, especially in respect of the inter-human 
relations (MuÑmalt), which we have already identified as the main objects of 
administration of justice. It is in that regard that Abd al ÑAti has correctly noted 
that “confusion arises when the term Shar‘ah is used uncritically to designate 
not only divine law in its pure principal form, but also the human subsidiary 
sciences including fiqh”.38 Thus, in its strict juridical sense the term Shar‘ah 
refers to the corpus of the divine law as contained in the Qur’an and the 
Sunnah of the Prophet. It differs in that context from Fiqh which refers to the 
understanding derived from the Shar‘ah by the Muslim jurists. Thus, Fiqh, 
which technically means jurisprudence, is non-divine and may change 
according to time and circumstances.  From that perspective, I submit that the 
Shar‘ah legal system consists of sources, methods and principles. While the 
sources, that is the Qur’an and Sunnah are divine, the methods, Ijm‘ and 
Qiys and the many principles that regulate its application are all human and 
flexible.   
 During Prophet Muhammad’s lifetime, the application of the Shar‘ah 
was relatively straight forward, as matters were normally referred to him and 
his decisions were accepted as conclusive. Thus, Ramadan has noted that “the 
structure of Islamic Law – the Shar‘ah – was completed during the lifetime of 
the Prophet, in the Qur’an and the Sunnah”.39 However, after the Prophet’s 
death, with the passage of time and the expansion of Islam, many new cases 
that were not specifically covered by the Qur’an or the Sunnah emerged. 
Relying, inter alia, on the Tradition of Mu’dh ibn Jabal in which the Prophet 
was reported to have asked one of his companions named Mu’dh ibn Jabal, 
whom he had deployed as a judge to Yemen, what would be his source of law 
in deciding cases, whereby Mu’dh was reported to have replied that he will 
judge with what is in the book of God (the Qur’an), and then the Sunnah of the 
Prophet and that if he found no clue in the sources would exercise his own 
reasoning (Ijtihd), which the Prophet was reported to have approved, 40 the 
concept of Ijtihd (legal reasoning) was utilised to devise the methods, namely 
 
38 H. Abd al ‘Ati. 1977. The Family Structure in Islam. Indianapolis: American Trust 
Publications. p.14. See also M. A. Baderin. 2003. International Human Rights and 
Islamic Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp.33-34. 
39 S. Ramadan. 1970. Islamic Law: Its Scope and Equity. London: Macmillan. p.36. 
40 See e.g. A. Hasan (Trans). Sunan Ab Dwd (India: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1984), 
Vol. III, p.1019, Hadîth No.3585. 
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Ijm‘, (consensus) and QiyÉs (analogy) by the early Muslim jurists as a means 
of addressing new situations that needed to be regulated, but not expressly 
covered by the Qur’an or the Sunnah. These methods facilitated the extension 
of the two divine sources to answer new legal questions that arose after the 
Prophet.  
 Thus, while the revealed sources of the Shar‘ah system ended with the 
demise of the Prophet, the evolved methods were the vehicle by which the 
Muslim jurists transported the Shar‘ah into the future. To enable the efficient 
and realistic application of law, relevant principles such as Öarrah 
(necessity), MaÎlaÍah (welfare), IstiÍsn (equity), Takhayyur (eclectic choice), 
Talfq (patching up), Siysah Shar‘iyyah (politics), and the principle of 
maqÎid al-Shar‘ah (objectives of the Shar‘ah), among others, were also 
evolved by the classical Islamic jurists. Thus, similar to the jurisconsults under 
traditional Roman law, the Muslim classical jurists also played an important 
role in the development of Islamic law, particularly through the formulation of 
its methods and principles. In its applied or jurisprudential sense, Islamic law 
is therefore often described as “jurists’ law” by many modern writers on the 
subject.41 
With the expansion of Islam outside Arabia, about 500 schools of Islamic 
jurisprudence (Madhhib) developed in the early years but most of them 
disappeared and others merged by the 10th century, leaving today, four main 
Sunn Schools42 of Islamic jurisprudence as well as different Sh‘ah schools43 
of jurisprudence, applicable today in different parts of the Muslim world. 
Based on their understandings of the provisions of the Shar‘ah through careful 
and prolonged study, the classical jurists of the different Schools of Islamic 
jurisprudence compiled books of Fiqh containing different jurisprudential 
 
41 See e.g. P. Rudolf, “From Jurists’ Law to Statute Law or What Happens When the 
Shari’a is Codified”(2002) 3 Mediterranean Politics, No.3, pp. 82-95.  
42 These are the MālikÊ School of Islamic law, which prevails, for example, in Morocco 
and Nigeria, the Shāfi‘ī School of Islamic law, which prevails, for example, in 
Malaysia and Kenya; the HanbalÊ School of Islamic law, which prevails, for example, 
in Saudi Arabia and Qatar; and the HanafÊ School of Islamic law, which prevails, for 
example, in Pakistan and Jordan. 
43 The major ones of which are the Ithnā Asharī School of Islamic law, which prevails, 
for example in Iran and Bahrain; the Zaydī School of Islamic law, with following, for 
example, in Yemen; the Ismā’ilī School of Islamic law, with following, for example, in 
India; and the ´Ibādī School of Islamic law, which prevails, for example, in Oman. 
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views on various issues.  The books of Fiqh containing the jurisprudential 
rulings subsequently became the material sources of reference under the 
Shar‘ah system.   
 By the 10th century, however, similar to what happened during the 
developing process of the Civil Law system in the 6th Century which led to the 
adoption of the Justinian Code, it was thought that the established Schools of 
Islamic jurisprudence had fully exhausted all possible questions of law and that 
the necessary interpretative materials of the Shar‘ah were fully formed and 
thus the practice of the legal reasoning of Ijtihd was generally discouraged. 
That consequently led to the claim of what was termed as “closing of the gate 
of Ijtihd”, which ushered in the practice of legal conformism (Taqld)
whereby Muslims were expected to conforming to or following the confirmed 
jurisprudential rulings in the Fiqh jurisprudential books of any one of the 
established Schools of jurisprudence.  
 As earlier mentioned, the theoretical concept of the closing of the gate of 
Ijtihd by the Muslim jurists in the 13th century was also partially aimed at 
controlling the divergence in interpretations and commentaries of the different 
jurists of the time. That slowed down the dynamism that had been injected into 
Islamic law from its inception, and thus, according to Iqbal, “reduced the law 
of Islam practically to a state of immobility”.44 Although many contemporary 
scholars have challenged the notion of the closing of the gate of Ijtihd, the 
practice of Taqld still prevails amongst lay judges of the lower Shar‘ah 
courts in many Muslim countries today.  Although Taqld remains a necessary 
methodology under the Shar‘ah for ensuring that those who are not fully 
qualified in the science of Islamic jurisprudence are able to base their decisions 
on relevant precedents laid down by the classical jurists, it must be 
distinguished from blind conservatism that does not allow for a reflective and 
contextual application of the classical precedents.   
 It is imperative to state that the concept of Taqld should neither place 
unnecessary restrictions on the development of new theories and principles of 
Islamic law by qualified scholars and jurists nor prevent qualified judges under 
the Shar‘ah system from exercising their legal reasoning in cases before them, 
within the context of the sources, methods and principles of Islamic law.  
 
44 M. Iqbal. 1954. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam. Lahore: Sh 
Muhammad Ashraf. p.148. 
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Actually, Muslim jurists are agreed on the fact that a qualified jurist or judge 
must exercise his own juristic opinion in accordance with the Shar‘ah, in 
every case before him, subject to a clear elaboration of the relevant 
methodologies of the law utilised in reaching his decision so that the validity 
of his judgment can be properly evaluated within the relevant rules of Islamic 
law.45 
Being mainly procedural, the process of administration of justice under 
the Shar‘ah system, is covered mostly under Fiqh provisions. Apart from few 
provisions, for example, on the number and quality of witnesses46 and the 
process of conciliation (ØulÍ) in marital disputes,47 the divine sources mainly 
cover substantive law while the relevant specific details on the legal process 
and procedure were provided by the jurists in their jurisprudential works. Thus, 
while the Qur’an or the Sunnah, may specify a crime, prescribe punishments, 
and enjoin substantive justice and general protection of the rights and security 
of the individual, they do not often provide specific details on procedural 
issues such as arrest, detention, investigation, prosecution, creation of courts, 
procedure for hearings, judicial reviews, appeals, etc. The minute details on the 
necessary procedure for the realisation of justice are left to the jurists and the 
relevant authorities of State to decide in accordance with the best interests of 
society.48  
45 See e.g. I. A. K. Nyazee, (Trans.) The Distinguished Jurist’s Primer, supra, fn 20 
above, Vol.1, p.xxxv; A. M. al-Ghazaāi. 1996. al-Mustasfā fī Ilm al-Usūl. Cairo: 
Makatabah al-Tijāriyyah. p.368. 
46 E.g. Q2:282; Q5:106; Q4:15; Q65:1-2 
47 E.g. Q4:35. 
48 For classical analysis of the development of Islamic judicial procedure, See e.g. M. 
Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah. 1961. Al-Turuq al-Hukmiyyah fi al-Siyāsah al-Shar‘iyyah 
[Arabic]. Cairo: al-Mu‘asasah al-Arabiyyah. p.218ff and al-Māwardi, al-Ahkām as-
Sultāniyyah: The Laws of Islamic Governance, Trans. A. Yate, (London, Ta Ha 
Publishers, 1996), pp.99ff. See also contemporary analysis on the subject by A. M. 
Awad, “The Rights of the Accused under Islamic Criminal Law” in M. C. Bassiouni, 
(ed.) The Islamic Criminal Justice (New York: Oceania Publications, 1982), pp. 91-92; 
T. J. Al-Alwani, “Judiciary and Rights of the Accused in Islamic Criminal Law”, in T. 
Mahmood, et al, (eds.) Criminal Law in Islam and the Muslim World (Delhi: Institute 
of Objective Studies, 1996), p.256-263; T. Mahmood, “Criminal Procedure at the 
Shari‘ah Law as Seen by Modern Scholars: A Review”, in T. Mahmood, et al, ibid., pp. 
292ff; and generally M. Lippman, et al, (eds.) Islamic Criminal Law and Procedure: 
An Introduction (New York: Praeger Publications, 1988). 
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Traditionally, drawing from the relevant practices of Prophet Muhammad and 
that of the  rightly guided Caliphs as well as from custom (Urf) during the 
early period of Islam, classical Muslim jurists endeavoured to lay down 
judicial procedures which they believed would facilitate the realisation of 
substantive justice within the boundaries of the divine Shar‘ah at that time. It 
is within that procedural context that principles of administration of justice 
under the Shar‘ah system are found.  These procedural principles as provided 
in the jurisprudential works of the classical Muslim jurists were not rigid but 
were adjusted in practice under the principle of siysah shar‘iyyah, especially 
during the Abbasid Caliphate to fulfil the needs of time and substantive justice.  
The historical development of the processes of administration of justice under 
the Shar‘ah system is therefore usually mapped from the early rudimentary 
practices of the Prophet’s time through the practices of the Rightly Guided 
Caliphs and rising to its peak during the Abbasid Caliphate when the judiciary 
and other relevant institutions  for an effective system of administration of 
justice, such as the shurÏah (police) and wilyah al-Íisbah (market 
inspectorate), etc, were formally established and some level of separation 
between the Caliphate and the judiciary were recognised, and relatively 
detailed rules of evidence and procedure instituted in the courts. JÉbir al-
ÑAlwÉnÊ has noted in that regard as follows: 
 
During the Prophet’s reign Madinah was small, and the community’s 
legal problems were few and uncomplicated. ... The institution of legal 
judgment during the times of the four rightly guided caliphs remained 
simple and uncomplicated. Judges had no court scribe or written record 
of their decisions, for these were carried out immediately and under the 
individual judge’s direct supervision. No detailed procedures were 
worked out for the judicial process, the registration of claims, the 
delineation of jurisdictions, or for any other matters that would arise 
later, for the lives of the people were not yet complicated enough to 
require such refinements. Even the Shari’a specified no details, but left 
them to be determined by ijtihad. In other words, the juridical system was 
allowed to develop in a way that would be the best suited for the peoples’ 
circumstances and customs. Under the four rightly guided caliphs, the 
judiciary was limited to resolving civil disputes. Other types of disputes, 
such as qisas (where capital punishment may be prescribed), hudud 
(where punishment, including capital punishment, is prescribed by the 
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Qu'ran), or ta’zïr (where punishment, including capital punishment, is 
left to the discretion of the judge or the ruler) were decided by the ruler 
or his appointed governor. Not a great deal of change in this institution 
took place under the Umayyids, particularly under the early rulers, so 
that procedures remained uncomplicated. The major development was 
confined mostly to recording decisions in order to avert evasion and 
forgetfulness. In fact, such an incident occurred during the reign of 
Mu’awiyah ibn Sufyan, when Salm ibn Mu’zz, the judge of Egypt, 
decided a case of inheritance. When the heirs reopened the dispute and 
returned to the judge, he recorded his decision in writing. This period 
also saw agreement upon the qualifications for a judge, the specification 
of a place in which the judicial procedure was to be carried out, and the 
development of the system by which injustices in public administration 
would be addressed. With the coming of the 'Abbasids, however, the 
judiciary made significant progress. Its sophistication grew in both form 
and procedure, and its vistas increased with the variety of cases heard. 
During this period the court register was introduced, the judge’s 
jurisdiction was increased, and the state established the position of Chief 
Judge (qdi al-qudh), which today is comparable to the office of the 
Chief Justice. One negative development, however, was the increasingly 
infirm nature of ijtihad, which limited the judges to following the 
previous rulings of the four established schools of thought: taqld. Thus 
in Iraq and the Eastern territories, judges ruled according to the rulings 
of Abu Hanifah; in Syria and Spain according to Malik, and in Egypt 
according to Imam Shafi’. After the Mongol destruction of Baghdad and 
the subsequent end of the 'Abbasid Empire in 1258 CE/606 AH, several 
smaller states emerged and developed their own legal institutions. While 
these legal institutions differed hardly at all in their foundations and the 
principles upon which they were established, they did differ significantly 
in matters of organisation, procedures, criteria for the appointment and 
removal of judges, and in the schools of legal thought followed. Ibn al 
Hasan al Nabah portrayed the judiciary of eighth-century (hijri) Spain 
as follows: ‘The authorities who deal with legal rulings are first the 
judges, then the central police, the local police, the appellate authority, 
the local administrator, and then the market controller’.”49 
49 T. J. Al-Alwani, “The Rights of the Accused in Islam” (1995) 10 Arab Law 
=
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Muslim scholars therefore fully agree that the processes of administration 
of justice under the Shar‘ah system are not and have never been static or 
inflexible; rather they leave room for necessary refinement as the needs of 
substantive justice demand from time to time and from place to place.50
Nevertheless, the main concern in many circles regarding administration 
of justice under the Shar‘ah system is the tendency to often represent the 
traditional juridical rules found in the classical Fiqh books as being carved in 
stone, static and invariable, which could greatly affect the realisation of 
substantive justice in modern times, as some of those procedural rules would 
not necessary meet the standards of administration of justice today. 
 In that regard, JÉbir al-ÑAlwÉnÊ has observed notably the need to 
appreciate that: 
 
... the Shari’a did not specify a particular juridical framework. 
Rather, it established the principles, general foundations, objectives, 
and sources of legislation. Organisational details (i.e., the extent of a 
judge’s jurisdiction, limitations of his authority in terms of time and 
place, the assignment (or lack thereof) of another judge to work 
alongside him) were to be determined by the people’s customs, needs, 
and circumstances. As there is nothing in the Shari’a that entrusts the 
juridical process to an individual or an institution, it was left up to the 
Muslim leadership to decide. The responsibility could be spread 
among several officials or confined to one, as long as the sole 
requirement was met: the ruler must ensure that those entrusted with 
this responsibility meet the Shari’a’s conditions.51 
Thus, while the chapters on administration of justice in the 
jurisprudential works of classical Muslim jurists may serve as starting points, 
they are not necessarily meant to be immutable. In fact many Muslim states 
operating the Shar‘ah system have, as is necessary, produced modern and 
 
Quarterly, No. 4, pp3-16 at.4-7 
50 Ibid.
51 These are: faith in Islam, maturity, ability to reason intelligently, freedom and 
trustworthiness, having all of one’s faculties, and knowledge of the Shari’a’s sources. 
(footnote part of quoted text). Ibid. 
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updated procedural rules for the administration of justice in the Shar‘ah courts 
as required to ensure substantive justice in today’s world. The approaches have 
not been monolithic, While some countries start with the classical rules in the 
traditional jurisprudential Fiqh books revising and adding new rules as is 
necessary, others have adapted either modern common law or civil law rules of 
procedure, revising and adding relevant Shar‘ah principles where necessary to 
make them Shar‘ah-compliant.  For example, in his paper on “Harmonization 
of Common Law and Shari’ah in Malaysia: A Practical Approach” delivered at 
the Harvard Law School in 2008 the Former Chief Justice of Malaysia, Tun 
Abdul Hamid Muhamad explained that what they did when the Shar‘ah courts 
were created in Malaysia was to take the “existing laws that were  currently in 
use in the common law courts as the basis to work on, remove or substitute the 
objectionable parts, add whatever needed to be added, make them Shar‘ah-
compliant and have them enacted as laws [of procedure for the Shar‘ah 
courts]”52 Thereby, according to the learned former Chief Justice:  
 
The provisions of the Shar‘ah criminal and civil procedure 
enactments/act  are, to a large extent, the same as those used in the 
common law courts. A graduate in law from any common law country 
reading the “Shar‘ah” law of procedure in Malaysia would find that 
he already knows at least 80% of them. On the other hand a graduate 
in Shar‘ah from Al-Azhar might find that he knows only about 20% of 
them. Of course, there are more traditional Shar‘ah or fiqh elements 
in the Shar‘ah Court Evidence Enactment/Act... Still, a common law 
lawyer reading them for the first time will find that he is reading 
something familiar, section by section, even word for word. Yet they 
are “Islamic law.53 
I concur with the learned former Chief Justice that such efforts are 
indeed within the framework of the Shar‘ah legal system as long as the 
adopted provisions do not conflict with substantive Shar‘ah provisions, and 
they facilitate the realisation of substantive justice in the Shar‘ah courts. 
 
52 (Tun) A. H. Mohamad, supra, fn 6 above, pp. 1-2. 
53 Ibid at p.10. 
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Similarly, Saudi Arabia enacted its Law of Procedure before Shar‘ah 
Courts in 2000 containing 266 articles of detailed procedural rules, and also its 
Law of Criminal Procedure in 2001 containing 225 articles of detailed 
procedural rules, most of which are procedural norms that one would not 
necessarily find in traditional Fiqh books but are rather modelled along modern 
common law and civil law procedural norms that ensure an effective 
administration of justice in modern times.   Article 1 of both Laws, however, 
provide that: 
 
Courts shall apply Shar‘ah principles, as derived from the Qur'an 
and Sunnah (the traditions of Prophet Muhammad, peace be upon 
him) to the cases that are brought before them. They shall also apply 
laws promulgated by the state that do not contradict the provisions of 
the Qur'an and Sunnah, and shall comply with the procedure set forth 
in this Law.
There have been similar varying endeavours by other Muslim countries 
in that regard. Thus there is much flexibility within the Shar‘ah system in 
formulating rules of procedure for a better administration of justice under the 
system as this falls mostly within the realms of Fiqh rather than the substantive 
provisions of the Shar‘ah, per se. 
 
The Common Law System 
 
The term “Common Law” can also be used in, at least, three contexts. First, 
the term can be used in a general legal context in reference to the legal 
tradition based on the common law of England and modelled on English law. 
In that sense it is distinguished from of other legal traditions such as the Civil 
Law system and the Shar‘ah legal system respectively. It is in that context 
that Common Law is being considered in relation to the two previously 
discussed legal systems. 
 Secondly, however, the term can also be used to distinguish “common 
law” as a source of law from “Equity” as a source of remedy under the 
Common Law system. Traditionally, two types of courts developed in England 
under its Common Law system, namely, the common law courts manned by 
common law judges and a court of chancery under the Lord Chancellor. 
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Plaintiffs who could not get a hearing or remedy in the common law courts due 
to its strict formality and technical rigidity were able to apply to the court of 
chancery where the Chancellor gave them a hearing and remedy, avoiding the 
strict formalities and technicalities of the common law courts and based his 
decisions on principles of natural justice, fairness, and what was equitable in 
the particular case. The court of chancery was therefore a Court of Equity 
which developed to provide remedies not available in the common law courts. 
The two courts were however combined by the Judicature Acts of 1873 and 
1875. Thus, both common law and equity are jointly applied today in a single 
court under the Common Law system. Both common law and equity are in that 
context considered as applicable “sources” of law by the courts under the 
general Common Law system.  
 Thirdly, the term Common Law can equally be used to distinguish “case 
law” as developed by the courts from “statutory law” as enacted by the 
legislature as sources of law under the general Common Law system. 
 The Common Law tradition originated in England based largely on the 
activities of the royal courts of justice after the Norman Conquest of England 
in 1066AD.54 Before the Norman Conquest, there was no centralised national 
legal system in England; rather there existed a system of oral customary rules, 
which varied according to the different regions. Each county had its own local 
court dispensing its own justice in accordance with local customs, which not 
only varied from community to community but were enforced in an arbitrary 
fashion, sometimes involving trial by ordeal or trial by duel. The local courts 
generally consisted of informal public assemblies that weighed the claims in 
each case and, if a decision could not be reached, would often require the 
defendant to test their guilt or innocence by some test of veracity, such as 
carrying a red-hot iron with bare hands, which creates burn wounds. If the 
consequent wounds healed within a prescribed period, that was taken as proof 
of the defendant’s innocence, but if it did not heal within the prescribed period 
that was taken as proof of the defendant’s guilt and an execution usually 
followed.  
 Unlike the Civil Law and Shar‘ah systems, which originated from 
textual sources, the English Common Law system did not originate from any 
 
54 R. David and  J.E. C. Brierly,  supra, fn 3 above, p.285. 
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particular set of texts but from what has been described as “tradition expressed 
in action”.55 It began as customary law used in the King’s court to settle 
disputes affecting the monarch directly. Initially, there were still different 
types of local courts operating alongside the King’s court, until 1154 when 
King Henry II institutionalised the Common Law system by creating a unified 
court system “common” to the whole of England by incorporating and 
elevating the local customs to the national level, thereby creating a centralised 
system, ended local control, eliminated arbitrary trials and remedies, and 
created a jury system of citizens sworn on oath to investigate criminal 
accusations and civil claims.  
 Judges appointed by the King would travel regularly throughout the 
country to bring the King’s justice to every citizen. The objective aim was that 
there should be a common system of law throughout the land, hence the laws 
became known as the Common Law. The travelling judges formed a nucleus 
of judges with national jurisdiction who had no local roots. They were thus 
much less susceptible to the corruption which had spoilt a similar attempt 
earlier in the twelfth century in which the royal judges had actually been based 
in the local communities. It was under Henry II that judges were for the first 
time sent on “circuits”, hearing pleas in the major places they visited and 
taking over the work of the local courts. In time the decisions of the judges 
were written down. As the decisions of these courts came to be recorded and 
published, so the practice developed where past decisions (precedents) would 
be cited in argument before the courts and would be regarded as being of 
persuasive authority.  
 These practices developed into the Common Law of England, the law 
which was available throughout the realm. Thus King Henry II is often 
regarded as the “father of the Common Law” largely because he was 
responsible for the regional and roving royal justice through which the law 
truly became commonly available to all. However, many other factors of a 
general historical nature contributed to the development of the Common Law. 
In the expansion of the King's legal powers, an important role was played by 
the clerics. They developed a range of claim forms, called writs, and 
established procedures which, perhaps significantly, gave them greater 
 
55 See generally, A. W. B. Simpson. 1986. Legal Theory and Legal History: Essays on 
the Common Law. Hambledon: Continuum International Publishing Group. 
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importance. The distinctive feature of Common Law is that it represents the 
law of the courts as expressed in judicial decisions. The grounds for deciding 
cases are found in the principles provided by past court decisions, as contrasted 
to a system which was based solely on Acts of Parliament. Apart from the 
system of judicial precedents, other characteristics of Common Law are trial 
by jury (although jury trials are not practised in many Common Law 
jurisdictions) and the doctrine of the supremacy of the law. Originally, 
supremacy of the law meant that not even the King was above the law; today it 
means that acts of governmental agencies and ministers can be challenged in 
the courts.  Thus, Common Law, sometimes called “case law” or “judge-made 
law", keeps the law in harmony with the needs of the community where no 
legislation is applicable or where the legislation requires interpretation. This 
explains the important role of the courts in the administration of justice under 
the Common Law system. Glenn notes that “the Common Law was therefore a 
law of procedure; whatever substantive law existed was hidden by it, 
“secreted” in its “interstices”, in the language of Maine.”56 
The procedure, according to Glenn, “was, and is, unique in the world and 
may be today the distinctive feature of the Common Law.”57 However, as the 
Common Law progressed, there developed a formality among judges, typified 
by a reluctance to deal with matters that were not or could not be processed in 
the proper form of action. Such a refusal to deal with injustices because they 
did not fall within the particular procedural and formal constraints, led to much 
dissatisfaction with the legal system. In addition, the Common Law courts 
were perceived to be slow, highly technical and very expensive, and a trivial 
mistake in pleading a case could lose a good argument. The only available 
remedy was damages, but such monetary compensation was not always the 
best remedy. The response to this shortcoming in the dispensation of justice by 
the Common Law courts was the development of Equity.   
 Thus Claimants who were unable to gain access to the Common Law 
courts could appeal direct to the sovereign, and such pleas would be passed for 
consideration and decision to the Lord Chancellor, who acted as “the King's 
conscience”. The Chancellor based his decisions on principles of natural 
justice and fairness, making a decision on what seemed “right” in the particular 
 
56 P. Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World, supra, fn 29 above, p. 243. 
57 Ibid. 
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case rather than following previous precedents. He would look beyond 
documents which were considered legally binding by the Common Law courts. 
To make sure his decisions were fair, new procedures, such as a subpoena 
requiring a witness to attend court, and new remedies, such as injunctions and 
specific performance, were developed. This resulted in the emergence of a 
specific court, a court of Chancery, constituted to deliver “equitable” or “fair” 
decisions in cases which the Common Law courts declined to deal with.  
 The Common Law courts and Court of Chancery operated separately. On 
occasion, this led to conflict, as the Common Law courts would make an order 
in favour of one party, and the Court of Chancery the other party. This 
situation was resolved by the Earl of Oxford’s case (1615), when the King 
ruled that in such cases equity, i.e. “fairness” would prevail. The division 
between the Common Law courts and the courts of equity continued until they 
were eventually combined by the Judicature Acts 1873–5. Thus the courts 
under the Common Law system are courts of both common law and equity. 
 Unlike the Civil Law system, the Common Law system tends to be case-
centred and hence judge-centred, allowing scope for a discretionary, pragmatic 
approach to the particular problems that appear before the courts. The law can 
therefore be developed on a case-by-case basis. Today, the Common Law 
system applies or at least has considerable influence in most, if not all, 
countries with colonial link with England. Even though these countries may 
have retained, in certain areas, their own traditions and concepts, the 
administration of justice generally, particularly in terms of  procedural norms 
and evidential rules have still remain largely established along Common Law 
lines.  
 Traditionally, the principal concern of the common law jurists, until the 
nineteenth century, was directed to the various formalistic procedures put into 
operation by writs, rather than to the elaboration of those principles upon 
which just solutions to disputes would be based.  
 In relation to administration of justice, the main critique against the 
Common Law system has thus been its over-emphasis of procedural rules 
which could sometimes lead to mere procedural justice to the detriment of 
realising substantive justice. There have been instances where cases are lost on 
mere technicalities of procedure to the abject disappointment of many. Often, 
common law judges, such as the late Lord Alfred Denning, would thus find 
ways of avoiding the strict adherence to procedural technicalities in favour of 
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doing substantive justice, whenever necessary.  He is quoted to have once 
noted in that regard: “Unlike my brother judge here, who is concerned with the 
law, I am concerned with justice.”58 
This analysis of the nature and evolution of each of the three legal 
systems reveal clearly that despite the fundamental differences in their nature 
and sources, their respective evolution reveals that a golden thread of 
pragmatism runs through them in relation to the administration of justice. The 
rules of administration of justice under each of the three legal systems are not 
strictly carved in stone but could be pragmatically adapted where necessary in 
the interest of achieving substantive justice.  We will now proceed to examine 
the institutional and procedural parameters of administration of justice in 
relation to the three legal systems. 
 
PARAMETERS OF ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN RELATION TO 
THE THREE LEGAL SYSTEMS 
 
The processes of administration of justice are normally broadly divided into 
administration of civil justice and administration of criminal justice, with 
different institutions and procedures. This division is recognised under each of 
the three legal systems with similarities as well as differences in that regard. 
For example, the rules on administration of criminal justice are often much 
more stringent than that of civil justice under all three systems. Ibn Qayyim al-
Jawziyyah has noted in respect of the SharÑah system that the nature of the 
procedure in cases depend on the types of claims involved, with accusatory 
cases (daÑwah al-tuhmah) requiring more stringent rules of procedure and 
standard of proof than non-accusatory cases (daÑwah ghayr al-tumah) which 
would require less complicated modes of trial and lower standards of proof.59 
As part and parcel of the respective legal systems, the processes of 
administration of justice have evolved over many centuries under each of the 
 
58 “Lawyer of the Century: Lord Denning”, The Lawyer 20 December 1999. Available 
at: http://www.thelawyer.com/lawyer-of-the-century/76615.article 
59 S. S. Shah, “The Principles and Procedure of Litigation in Islamic Law: A 
Contemporary Structuring” (2007) 51 The Islamic Quarterly, No.2, p.163 at 164;  Ibn 
Qayyim al-Jawziyyah. 1985. al-Turuq al-Hukmiyyah fi al-Siyāsah al-Sha‘’iyyah. 
Egypt: Matba’atal-Madani. p.103. 
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three legal systems. Traditionally the ruling King or Khalf combined wide-
ranging executive and judicial powers and judges only operated on the basis of 
delegated powers from the ruler. In comparative terms, the administration of 
both civil and criminal justice has evolved much more rapidly under the 
Common Law and Civil Law systems, particularly in terms of procedural 
rules.  The two systems have learnt from experiences and have been amenable 
to changes and reviews of their systems over time in respect of both civil and 
criminal procedure. This has not been the case with the Shar‘ah system 
generally. While there have been significant positive development in some 
Muslim countries that apply the Shar‘ah system, there is still very much to be 
done in most Muslim countries in terms of procedure and structure in relation 
to the administration of justice.  Thus, Omar Sherif, writing on the generalities 
of criminal procedure under the Shar‘ah, noted that “when dealing with 
criminal procedure under Islamic Shari’a within the contemporary context, ... 
one must recognize the fact that, while studies on criminal procedure in 
contemporary legal systems have witnessed noticeable progress and are now 
fully structured, studies on criminal procedure under the Shari’a have not 
been developed accordingly.”60 This is not a critique of the Shar‘ah system 
per se, because, as earlier stated, there is ample flexibility within the system to 
facilitate the enhancement of the Shar‘ah procedures and institutions of 
administration of justice. Rather, the problem is that Muslim states have, until 
recently, been generally very slow in addressing the reform needs of their 
Shar‘ah judicial systems. Often, this has been in fear of being accused of 
imitating “Western” legal systems, which, in the light of our earlier analysis of 
the Shar‘ah system, may not necessarily be true. 
Contextually, the administration of both civil and criminal justice can be 
perceived as consisting of three interdependent  stages that must work together 
for the effective realisation of substantive justice, namely, the “pre-litigative 
stage”, the “litigative stage” and the “post-litigative stage”. To work 
efficiently, each of these three stages require relevant components and 
imperatives identifiable as “pre-litigative imperatives”, “litigative imperatives” 
and “post-litigative imperatives”, that must be discharged within each of the 
 
60 A. O . Sherif, “Generalities on Criminal Procedure under Islamic Shari’a” in M. 
Abdel-Haleem, et. al., (ed.) Criminal Justice in Islam: Judicial Procedure in the 
Sharī’a, (London: I. B, Tauris), p.3. 
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three levels to ensure accessible justice and equitable social order in society as 
a whole. 
 Procedurally, the “pre-litigative imperatives” would cover conciliatory 
and mediatory measures in civil disputes, while, in criminal matters, it would 
cover investigative and interrogative measures before actual litigation. The 
“litigative imperatives” would cover all issues relating to adequate judicial 
safeguards that ensure fair trial during litigation in both civil and criminal 
matters, while the “post-litigative imperatives” would cover all issues relating 
to fair and effective enforcement of judicial decisions in both civil and 
criminal matters. These three levels are often inter-related with one another, 
and depending on the particular legal system, the different components of 
administration of justice play different complementary roles at different stages 
of the process towards the fair delivery of justice.  
 Thus, even though the judiciary is often at the centre of administration of 
justice in every legal system, it is certainly not the only relevant institution in 
that regard. Other relevant institutions would include, among others, the police 
force, prosecutors, legal practitioners, prison services and even the executive 
arm of government, owing to the prerogative powers it may sometimes 
exercise on judicial decisions.  We will now briefly examine these different 
procedural and institutional parameters of administration of justice in relation 
to the three legal systems. 
 
A- Pre-litigative stage 
 
The pre-litigative stage of administration of justice refers to the stage before a 
dispute is formally brought to court. The components and processes at this 
stage would differ depending on whether the matter is a civil or criminal one. 
In civil matters, the imperatives are those that encourage and help the disputing 
parties to resolve their dispute in a pacific way. Common Law jurisdictions 
such as the US, Australia and England have long embraced Alternative 
Dispute Resolution (ADR) processes, in forms of acknowledged conciliatory 
and mediatory means of resolving disputes, as effective means of increasing 
access to justice under the Common Law system.  Even though Civil Law 
jurisdictions have been slower in embracing ADR processes, it has recently 
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started gaining ground under the Civil Law system too.61 It is well recognised 
that ensuring adequate pre-litigative imperatives that facilitate pacific 
settlement of disputes amongst the populace is an important means of ensuring 
qualitative and cooperative administration of justice that eliminates the 
psychological, emotional and physical stress involved in litigating disputes 
formally in the courts.  
 The Shar‘ah system also encourages pre-litigative imperatives to 
facilitate pacific settlement of disputes through the processes of ØulÍ 
(Conciliation), WasÏah (Mediation) or TaÍkm (Arbitration) as is evident from 
Qur’anic provisions such as: 
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There is no good in most of their secret talks, except he who orders 
charity or goodness or conciliation between people; and whoever 
does that seeking the pleasure of Allah, We shall soon give him a 
great reward” - Q4:114  
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And if a woman fears cruelty or desertion on her husband’s part, 
there is blame on them both if they arrange conciliation between 
themselves; and conciliation is best;  even though human souls are 
swayed by greed; but if you do good and fear Allah, then Allah is 
well-acquainted with all that you do” - Q4:128 
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If you fear a breach between them both [husband and wife] then 
appoint an arbiter from his [the husband’s] family and an arbiter 
 
61 See e.g. N. Alexander, “From Common Law to Civil Law Jurisdictions: Court ADR 
on the Move in Germany” (2001) 4 The ADR Bulletin, No.8, pp110-113. 
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from her [the wife’s] family; if they both wish for conciliation Allah 
will enable their reconciliation; indeed Allah is All-knowing and Well-
acquainted - Q4:35 
 
The Prophet Muhammad is also reported to have said in a reported Tradition 
that 
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Conciliation between Muslims is permissible, except for a conciliation 
that makes the lawful unlawful and the unlawful lawful and Muslims 
are bound by their terms, except a term that makes the lawful unlawful 
and unlawful lawful.”62 
The specific rules and principles of pacific settlement of disputes are 
found in jurisprudential works of different classical Muslim jurists. An 
important part of the Shar‘ah court system during the period of the Abbasids 
was the formal establishment of a consortium of conciliators called 
“MuÎliÍn” who were  very skilled in conciliation and mediation to facilitate 
the pacific settlement of disputes between the parties at the pre-litigative stage. 
They played an important pre-litigation role of conciliation in civil matters 
such as marriage, debt recovery, property rights, etc, and tried to resolve 
disputes in that regard pacifically. 
 Muslim states can therefore institute comprehensive processes to 
facilitate pacific settlement of disputes at the pre-litigative stage within their 
respective Shar‘ah legal systems without  being seen as emulating the 
practices under the Common Law or Civil Law systems but actually 
practicalising what already existed under the classical Shar‘ah system.  
In criminal matters, the respective roles of the police, prosecutors, 
investigative judges and legal practitioners at the pre-litigative stage of the 
criminal justice system are well recognised under the three legal systems. In 
that regard there are at least 11 international minimum standards or procedural 
 
62 M. Naisābūrī. 1998. Al-Mustadrak alā al-Sahīhayn. Beirut: Dār al-Ma’rifah. Vol.5, 
2954. 
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rights recognised under international human rights law, which all individuals 
are expected to enjoy at the pre-litigative stage of the criminal justice 
processes of every legal system. These are:  
 
- The right of a person not to be tried or punished again for an offence for 
which he has already been fully convicted or acquitted 
- The right not to be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with 
privacy63;
- The right not to be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or deprived of 
liberty except in accordance with the law64;
- The right, if arrested, to be informed, at the time of arrest, of reasons for 
the arrest and to be promptly informed of any charges in detail and in a 
language understood by the accused65;
- The right, if arrested or detained on a criminal charge, to be brought 
promptly before a judicial authority and be tried within a reasonable time 
or be released66;
- The right, if awaiting trial, to be released subject to guarantees to appear 
for trial67;
- The right, if detained, to take proceedings before a court to decide, 
without delay, on the lawfulness of such detention and an order for 
release if the detention is not lawful68;
- The right of the accused, if detained (pending trial), to be treated with 
humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person69;
- The right of an accused person to be segregated from convicted persons 
and to separate treatment appropriate to the status of an unconvicted 
person70;
63 See Art. 17 ICCPR and Art. 12 UDHR. 
64 See Art. 9(1) ICCPR and Art. 3 UDHR. See also Principle 2, UN Body of Principles 
for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention and Imprisonment 
(1988), GA Res. 43/173 of 9 December 1988.  
65 Art. 9(2) and 14(3)(a) ICCPR. See also Principle 10, UN Body of Principles 1988, 
ibid. 
66 Art. 9(3) ICCPR; See also Principle 11(1) and 38, UN Body of Principles 1988. ibid.
67 Ibid. See also Principle 39, UN Body of Principles 1988, ibid. 
68 Art. 9(4) ICCPR. See also Principle 32, UN Body of Principles 1988, ibid.
69 Art. 10(1) ICCPR See also Principle 6, UN Body of Principles 1988, ibid.
70 Art. 10(2)(a) ICCPR. See also Principle 8, UN Body of Principles 1988, ibid.
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- The right of an accused juvenile person to be separated from adults and to 
be brought as speedily as possible for adjudication71;
- The right of an accused person to have adequate time and facilities to 
prepare his defence and to communicate with counsel of his own 
choosing.72
- The right, if a victim of unlawful arrest or detention, to an enforceable 
right to compensation.73 
While some scholars are of the view that these rights are only attainable under 
the liberal principles of the Common and Civil Law systems,74 it is important 
to note that these pre-litigative rights do not also conflict with any substantive 
provisions or principles under the Shar‘ah, but rather one would find relevant 
provisions under the Shar‘ah to substantiate them. Muslim countries do not 
therefore have any legitimate excuse under the Shar‘ah not to guarantee these 
rights within their administration of justice in accordance with the Shar‘ah.
B- Litigative Stage 
 
The litigatve stage in the administration of justice relates to the actual court 
trial in civil and criminal cases. The relevant imperatives at this stage would 
cover all issues relating to adequate judicial safeguards that ensure fair trial 
during litigation in both civil and criminal matters. This stage would involve 
prosecutors, judges, legal practitioners, amongst others. To promote the 
realisation of substantive justice, there are at least 13 international minimum 
standards or procedural rights which all individuals are expected to enjoy at 
this stage in relation to both civil and criminal justice processes of every legal 
system. These are: 
 
71 Art. 10(2)(b)ICCPR See also Rule 29, UN Rules for the Protection of Juveniles 
Deprived of their Liberty, 1990. 
72 Art. 14(3(b) ICCPR See also Principles 7, 8, and 21, UN Basic Principles on the Role 
of Lawyers, 1990. 
73 Art. 9(5) ICCPR. 
74 See e.g. M. Nowak. 2005. Commentary on the UN Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, 2nd Ed. Kehl: Engel. p.237. 
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- The right to equality before the law, the courts and tribunals.75 
- The right to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and 
impartial tribunal established by law.76 
- The right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.77 
- The right to be tried without undue delay.78
- The right to be tried in person and to defend oneself in person or through 
legal assistance of one’s own choosing.79 
- The right of an accused person to be informed of the right to legal 
assistance if he does not have legal assistance.80
- The right of an accused person to have legal assistance assigned to him in 
any case where the interest of justice so requires without payment in any 
such case if he has no sufficient means to pay for it.81 
- The right of an accused person to examine, or have examined, the 
witnesses against him and to obtain the attendance and examination of 
witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as witnesses against 
him.82 
- The right of an accused person to a free interpreter if he cannot 
understand or speak the language used in the court.83 
- The right of an accused person not to be compelled to testify against 
himself or to confess guilt.84 
- The right of accused juvenile persons to the procedure that shall take 
account of their age and the desirability of promoting their 
rehabilitation.85 
75 Art. 14(1) and Art. 26 ICCPR; Art. 7 UDHR. 
76 Art. 14(1) ICCPR; Art. 10 UDHR. See also Principle 5, UN Basic Principles on the 
Independence of the Judiciary, 1985. 
77 Art. 14(2) ICCPR; Art. 11 UDHR. See also Principle 36(1) of the UN Body of 
Principles for the Protection of All Persons under any Form of Detention or 
Imprisonment, 1988. 
78 Art. 14(3)(c) ICCPR 
79 Art.14(3)(d) ICCPR See also Principle 1, UN Basic Principles on the Role of 
Lawyers 1990.  
80 Ibid. See also Principle 5, UN Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers 1990, ibid.
81 Ibid. See also Principle 3, UN Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers 1990, ibid.
82 Art.14(3)(e) ICCPR. 
83 Art. 14(3)(f) ICCPR. 
84 Art. 14(3) (g) ICCPR. 
85 Art. 14(4) ICCPR. 
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- The right not to be subjected to a retroactive criminal law or heavier 
punishment86
- The right of an offender to benefit from a retroactive lighter criminal 
punishment.87 
It is often presumed that the Common Law and Civil Law systems, being 
secular systems, should be able to adapt to these principles without much 
problem, but that the Shar‘ah system being based on divine sources may not 
easily adapt to the principles. This is not necessarily so. Although the above 
provisions may not be found expressis verbis in the classical Islamic 
jurisprudential books, it is not difficult to establish all those guarantees within 
the Shar‘ah and the general principles of administration of justice as laid 
down by the classical Islamic jurists in their different jurisprudential treatises. I 
have analysed comprehensively elsewhere that all the above principles are 
achievable within the application of Islamic law, and that Muslim states have 
no excuse under the Shar‘ah not to ensure these procedural guarantees at the 
litigative stage of their administration of justice under the Shar‘ah system.88  
For example one can find many of these principles reflected in the 
remarkable and famous letter written by the second Islamic Khalf, Umar ibn 
al-Khatb, to Ab MsÉ al-´Ash’ar in relation to how he should administer 
justice as a judge in Kf as early as the 7th Century, even before the modern 
concepts of fair trial and due process were formulated. Umar is recorded to 
have instructed AbMsa in the letter as follows: 
 
The office of judge is a religious duty and a generally followed 
practice. Understand the depositions that are made before you, for it 
is useless to consider a plea that is not valid. Consider all people 
equal before you in your court and in your attention, so that the noble 
will not expect you to be partial and the humble will not despair of 
justice from you. The claimant must produce evidence; from the 
defendant an oath may be exacted. Compromise is permissible among 
Muslims, but not any agreement through which something forbidden 
 
86 Art. 15(1) ICCPR; Art. 11(2) UDHR. 
87 Art. 15(2) ICCPR. 
88 See M. A. Baderin. 2005. International Human Rights and Islamic Law. Oxford: 
OUP. pp.97-113. 
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would be rendered permissible, or something permitted forbidden.  If 
you gave judgment yesterday, and today upon reconsideration come to 
the correct opinion, you should not feel prevented by your first 
judgment from retracting; for justice is primeval and it is better to 
retract than to persist in error.  
Use your brain about matters that perplex you and to which neither 
the Qur’an nor the Sunnah seem to apply. Study similar cases and 
evaluate the situation through analogy with them. If a person brings a 
claim, which he may or not be able to prove, set a time limit for him. If 
he adduces evidence within the time limit set, you should allow his 
claim; otherwise you are permitted to give judgement against him. 
This is the better way to forestall or clear up any possible doubt.  All 
Muslims are acceptable as witnesses against each other, except such 
as have received a punishment provided by the religious law, such as 
are proved to have given false witness, and such are suspected of 
partiality on the ground of client status or relationship, for Allah, 
praised be He, forgives because of oaths and postpones punishment in 
face of the evidence. Avoid fatigue and weariness and annoyance at 
the litigants. For establishing justice in the courts of justice, Allah will 
grant you a rich reward and give you a good reputation. Farewell.89 
Similar to the other legal systems the judiciary occupies the central role in the 
administration of justice under the Shar‘ah system, particularly at the 
litigative stage. There are many areas of common ground between the 
Shar‘ah, the Common Law and Civil Law systems in that regard, but also 
some significant areas of apparent differences. For brevity, I will quickly 
highlight two of those areas of apparent differences and possible ways of 
resolving them. 
 The first point is in relation to the appointment of female judges under 
the Shar‘ah legal system. In his al-AÍkm al-ØulÏniyyah al-Mwardi noted 
that no one can be appointed as judge under the Shar‘ah system unless he 
fulfils all the conditions necessary for such appointment. He then listed seven 
main conditions, the first of which is that the appointee must be male and 
 
89 See Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History, (Ed.) N. J. Dawood, 
and (Trans.) Franz Rosenthal. 1989. Princeton University Press. p.173. 
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mature, and that a female may not be appointed as a judge.  While majority of 
the classical Muslim jurists concur with this view, Imm Ab Hanfah opines 
that a woman may be appointed as a judge regarding those matters in which 
the evidence of women are acceptable. Imm Ibn Jarr al-Tabari is however of 
the opinion that a woman can be appointed as a judge in all cases in the same 
way as a man. It is clear that the position of the majority of classical Muslim 
jurists contrasts sharply with the position under both the Common Law and 
Civil Law today. Some Muslim States have however adopted the position of 
Imm al-Tabar in that regard. For example, in 1982 a petition was brought 
before the Federal Shariat Court of Pakistan in the case of Ansar Burney v 
Federation of Pakistan challenging the appointment of women judges as being 
violative of the Shar‘ah. In his judgment, the Chief Judge of the Federal 
Shariat Court, Justice Aftab Hussain, CJ, extensively examined the different 
opinions of classical Islamic jurists on the issue and relying on the view of 
Imm al-Tabar and a similar view attributed to Imm Mlik, found that the 
appointment of a woman as a judge was not contrary to the Shar‘ah. Other 
Muslim States are slowly adopting this view. For example Bahrain appointed 
its first female judge in 2006, while the United Arab Emirates appointed its 
first female judge in March 2008. Also in February 2009, two female judges 
were appointed to the Shar‘ah court in the West Bank in Palestine. 
 In view of the fact that most of the Shar‘ah courts in Muslim countries 
today deal mainly with family-law matters such as marriage, divorce, child 
custody, child support and inheritance, it is hereby submitted that allowing 
women to be appointed as judges in the Shar‘ah courts would greatly enhance 
the realisation of substantive justice at the litigative stage of administration of 
justice under the Shar‘ah system as long as they have the requisite 
qualifications to be so appointed.  
 The second point is in relation to the right of a litigant to be represented 
by a legal practitioner. While legal representation is well recognised and 
encouraged under both the Common Law and Civil Law systems, there is a 
general assumption that legal representation by counsel is not recognised under 
the Shar‘ah legal system because the issue has not been specifically addressed 
in the classical jurisprudential books on Islamic legal procedure.  In response 
to such assumptions, JÉbir al-ÑAlwÉnÊ has observed that: “This apparent 
omission [of specific discussion of the need for legal representation in 
classical Islamic jurisprudence] might be due to the fact that, historically, 
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court sessions [under the Shar‘ah system] were public [and] widely attended 
by legal scholars  and experts, whose presence represented a true and 
responsible legal advisory board that actively assisted the judge in dispensing 
justice, [thus] there was never any need for professional counsel”.90 
Further research reveals that even though the early Islamic jurists 
concentrated largely on the litigant presenting his case personally, they 
nevertheless recognised the right of a litigant to appoint another person to 
represent him. This was often based on the concept of agency (waklah).91 It is 
reported for instance that the fourth Islamic Khalf, Ali ibn Ab Tlib, disliked 
litigation, so he would usually appoint Aql ibn Ab Tlib or Abdullah bn 
Ja’far as his attorneys to represent him.92 Also in his work titled Trkh QuÌt
QurÏubah, (History of the Judges of Cordova), al-Khushn records the 
example of two men who brought a matter before the judge AÍmad ibn Bq.
In presenting their cases, the judge observed that one of the men was very 
eloquent while the other had problems presenting his case eloquently.  The 
judge thus advised the latter saying: “Would it not be better if you were 
represented by someone who could match the verbal skills of your opponent?” 
The man answered saying: “But I only speak the truth”. The judge in insisting 
that he engaged a counsel said: “How many men have perished [due to lack of 
eloquence even though] telling the truth!”93 It is also very clear that there is 
nothing under the Shar‘ah that prohibits legal representation, especially in 
criminal trials94, and thus under the principle of legality, which is to the effect 
 
90 See T. J.  Al-Alwani, “Judiciary and Rights of the Accused in Islamic Criminal Law” 
in Mahmood, et.al (Eds.)  supra, fn 49  above, p. 256 at 274. 
91 See e.g. W. Al-Zuhaylī, al-Fiqh al-Islamiyy wa Adillatuh, Vol. 5, p.4077. See also G. 
M. Azad, Judicial System of Islam (Islamabad: Islamic Research Institute, 1987) p.108-
113 for a discussion of the views of different scholars on this point. 
92 See A. al-Bayhāqī, Kitāb al-Sunan al-Kubrā (1925) 26 cited in O. A. al-Saleh, “The 
Right of the Individual to Personal Security in Islam” in Bassiouni, M.C., (Ed.) supra, 
fn 49 above, p.81. See also W. al-Zuhaylī, W., supra, fn 92 above, p. 4077; G. M. 
Azad, ibid., p.108. 
93 See Al-Khushānī, Tārīkh Qudāt Qurtubah, cited in Awad, A.M., “The Rights  of the 
Accused Under Islamic Criminal Procedure” in Bassiounic, M.C., (Ed.) supra, above 
p.91 at 99 footnote 4. 
94 See H. Esmaeili, H., and J. Gans, “Islamic Law Across Cultural Borders: The 
Involvement of Western Nationals in Saudi Murder Trials” (2000) 28 Denver Journal 
of International Law and Policy, No.2, p. 145 at 150, and F. E. Vogel, Islamic Law and 
Legal System: Studies of Saudi Arabia (Leiden: Brill, 2000), pp.160-161. 
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that all actions are considered legal unless clearly prohibited by the Shar‘ah,95 
it will be wrong to contend that legal representation is prohibited within the 
administration of justice under the Shar‘ah legal system without any specific 
provision of the Shar‘ah prohibiting it as such.  
 Although legal representation by counsel is not generally practised in the 
Shar‘ah judicial system of some Muslim States, there is nothing in Islamic 
law that prevents the use of counsel to protect the interest of litigants and to 
ensure substantive justice. Due to the fact that most individuals are generally 
ignorant of the law and oblivious of their rights under the Shar‘ah, the right to 
effective legal representation in Shar‘ah courts has actually become more 
imperative today under Islamic law, especially in criminal cases. The 
guarantee of effective legal representation for the defendant will no doubt 
ensure equality of arms at law especially in criminal trials between individuals 
and State Prosecutors who, on their part, are often well trained and not 
oblivious of the law as is the accused person. Many contemporary writers on 
Islamic law have argued that the right to legal representation falls within the 
“theory of protected interest” of the individual under Islamic law and must be 
fully ensured by the State.96 It is notable, in that regard, that many Muslim 
States, including Malaysia, Saudi Arabia and Nigeria, acknowledge the right to 
legal representation under their Shar‘ah criminal justice systems.  
 In light of the above analysis, although legal representation by counsel as 
we know it today may not have been specifically addressed in the 
jurisprudential works of classical Islamic jurists, there is no doubt that such 
representation is an important element of fair trial and due process that is fully 
accommodatable within the limits and flexibility of procedural law under the 
Shar‘ah.
95 This is expressed by the Islamic legal maxim “al-Asl fī ashyā’ ibāhah”. See e.g. S. 
Ramadan. 1970. Islamic Law: Its Scope and Equity. London: Macmillan. p.68. 
96 See e.g. T. J. Al-Alwani, supra, fn 49 above, pp.274-276; O. A. al-Saleh, supra, fn 49 
above, pp. 81-84;  A.M. Awad, supra, fn 49 above p. 95;  T. Mahmood, ‘Criminal 
Procedure at the Shari‘ah Law as Seen by Modern Scholars: A Review’, in Mahmood, 
T., et al, supra, fn 49 above, p. 300. 
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C- Post-litigative Stage 
 
The post litigative stage in the administration of justice relates mainly to the 
fair and effective enforcement of judicial decisions in both civil and criminal 
matters.  Generally, there are four main identifiable minimum guarantees that 
must be ensured at this stage by every legal system, which are: 
 
- The right of appeal to a higher tribunal.97 
- The right of a person not to be tried or punished again for an offence for 
which he has already been fully convicted or acquitted in accordance 
with the law and penal procedure of each country.98 
- The right to compensation according to law for wrongful conviction.99 
- The right, if detained (after trial), to be treated with humanity and with 
respect for the inherent dignity of the human person.100 
- These post-litigative guarantees are also all achievable within the 
administration of justice under the Common Law, Civil Law and Shar’iah 
legal systems respectively.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
There is today a general perception that the  traditional differences between the 
Common Law and Civil Law systems have shrunk greatly and that both, being 
secular “Western” systems, should be able to accommodate one another and 
impact on one another easily and positively. It is the Shar‘ah system, being 
based on divine law,  that is often perceived as being radically different and 
possibly not having anything in common with either the Common Law or the 
Civil Law systems respectively. Our analysis of administration of justice in 
this paper however demonstrates that the jurisprudence of the three legal 
systems have evolved along similar lines and that under each of the systems 
the relevant theories and principles of administration of justice have been 
 
97 Art. 14(5) ICCPR. 
98 Art. 14(7) ICCPR. 
99 Art. 14(6)ICCPR 
100 Art. 10(1)and 10(3) ICCPR 
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influenced by reasonableness and expediency which gives room for the 
necessary flexibility to ensure the realisation of substantive justice under each 
one of the three legal systems, if there is the political and judicial will to do so 
on the part of the ruling authority, the judiciary and other relevant institutions 
of administration of justice respectively.  In view of the continuing interaction 
between the three legal systems in different countries of the world today, there 
is a need to continue promoting a better understanding of the systems to 
enhance an effective administration of justice across the legal systems 
globally.  
 In my view, this is why the combined law programme in Shar‘ah and 
Common Law offered by the Islamic Sciences University of Malaysia and 
other universities in other parts of the world today should be applauded as a 
necessary and valuable means of training future legal experts who would not 
only be well grounded in the Shar‘ah but also in the Common Law system.  I 
had the same unique combined undergraduate training in Shar‘ah Law and 
Common Law from the Usmanu Danfodiyo University in Nigeria many years 
ago, for which I am very proud today as it gives me a very rounded 
comparative understanding of the Shar‘ah and Law generally, which I think is 
very necessary in the international legal community today. 
 Once again, I thank USIM for inviting me as the guest lecturer for this 
year’s Tuanku Najihah Annual Lecture and I also thank you all, respected 
guests, for your kind audience. 
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